Daniel J. Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, Taylor Armstrong by Lorene Armstron v. Glen C. Pickett and John Does : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Daniel J. Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, Taylor
Armstrong by Lorene Armstron v. Glen C. Pickett
and John Does : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven B. Smith; Willaim G. Wilson; Scalley & Reading, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant Glen Pickett.
Robert H. Wilde; Wilde & Associates; Attorney for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Armstrong v. Pickett, No. 20010167.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1786
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
DANIEL J. ARMSTRONG, JARED 
ARMSTRONG, TAYLOR 
ARMSTRONG BY LORENE 
ARMSTRONG, his guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN C. PICKETT and JOHN DOES 1-
5, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
STEVEN B. SMITH, No. 5797 
WILLIAM G. WILSON, No. 8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Glen C. Pickett 
SUPREME COURT CASE No. 20010167 
Civil No. 980908711 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
ROBERT H. WILDE, No. 3466 
WILDE & ASSOCIATES 
935 East South Union Avenue 
Suite D102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Appellees, Daniel 
Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Taylor 
Armstrong 
i s i _ Eur •*. -
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, GLEN C. PICKETT 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
DANIEL J. ARMSTRONG, JARED 
ARMSTRONG, TAYLOR 
ARMSTRONG BY LORENE 
ARMSTRONG, his guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN C. PICKETT and JOHN DOES 1-
5, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
STEVEN B. SMITH, No. 5797 
WILLIAM G. WILSON, No. 8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Glen C. Pickett 
SUPREME COURT CASE No. 20010167 
Civil No. 980908711 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
ROBERT H. WILDE, No. 3466 
WILDE & ASSOCIATES 
935 East South Union Avenue 
Suite D102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Appellees, Daniel 
Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Taylor 
Armstrong 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, GLEN C. PICKETT 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 6 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 6 
Issue #1: 6 
Standard of Review 7 
Preservation of the Appeal 7 
Issue #2: 7 
Standard of Review 7 
Preservation of the Appeal 7 
Issue #3: 8 
Standard of Review 8 
Preservation of the Appeal 8 
Issue #4: 9 
Standard of Review 9 
Preservation of the Appeal 10 
Issue #5: 10 
Standard of Review 10 
Preservation of the Appeal 11 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 11 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 11 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 11 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 
ARGUMENT 24 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Daniel Armstrong Damages for 
the Loss of an Automobile He Did Not Own 24 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding General Damages to Daniel 
Armstrong Because Daniel Armstrong Did Not Meet Any of the 
Threshold Required bv U.C A. S 31 A-22-309(l) and He Was Not 
Therefore, Entitled to Recover Any General Damages. 26 
ii 
A. The Aggravation of Daniel Armstrong's Preexisting Back 
Injury Was Not a Permanent Injury Based Upon Objective 
Findings 27 
B. The Statutory Threshold Limitations of the PIP Statute 
Provided Pickett with Tort Immunity for Dan Armstrong's 
Claims for General Damages 31 
C. Even if the PIP Threshold Limitations Do Not Apply, the 
Evidence Does Not Support the General Damage Award to 
Dan Armstrong 34 
III. Jared's Scars Were Not Permanently Disfiguring and He. Therefore, 
is Not Entitled to any General Damages 36 
The Evidence Does Not Support the General Damages 
Awarded to Jared Armstrong 37 
IV. The Trial Court's Award of $350.000 in General Damages to Taylor 
Armstrong Was Based on Speculation and Conjecture 40 
CONCLUSION 45 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 45 
ADDENDA 46 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 Utah App. 285 \ 16, 12 P.3d 1015 34,35 
Drake v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 9 
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 38 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460 34 
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 43 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) 43,44 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986) 27 
Staheli v. Farmers'Co-op. ofS. Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982) 44 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) 37 
Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (UT 1980) 33 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App.1995) 8 
Cal Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995) 8 
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 927 P.2d 176 
(Utah 1996) 37 
Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E. 2d 832 (1987) 34 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 1777 (Utah 1998) 31 
Friendly Village v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co, 107 Cal Rptr 123 (Cal. App. 1973) 24 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App.1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988) 8 
iv 
H.J., M.J., andJ.M. v. State of Utah, 986 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1999) 6 
Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403 (Utah 1978) 25 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372 (Utah 1997) 6 
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 5, If 17, 994 P.2d 817 8 
McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1997) 27 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995) 37 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995) 38 
OngMl, Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utahl993) 7 
State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995) 31 
State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994) 9 
State v. Walker, 1A2> P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 8 
Zoll&Branch, P.C v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592 (Utah 1997) 37 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 6 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-109(l) 10, 12,26, 34 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) 7, 9, 11-12, 14-15, 19,26-27, 31-34, 37-40,45 
Utah Const, art VIII, §§ 1 & 3 6 
v 
Secondary Sources 
Am. Jur. Parties, § 30 24 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Fourth Edition (2000) 38 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, ch. 55, § 2, 1973 Utah Laws 141 32 
Cambridge Dictionary of American English Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ . 38 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) 38 
vi 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a Judgment rendered by the honorable Homer Wilkinson in 
favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees, Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Armstrongs" or "Plaintiffs") for special and 
general damages against Defendant/Appellant, Glen C. Pickett ("Pickett"). The Utah 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)0) and Utah Const, art VIII, §§ 1 & 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
This appeal involves the following five issues: 
Issue #1: 
Whether Daniel Armstrong should have been allowed to pursue and recover for 
property damage to a vehicle he did not own and which was not registered to him. 
Standard of Review 
"The issue of standing is primarily a matter of law, reviewed for correctness." 
H.J., M.J., andJ.M. v. State of Utah, 986 P.2d 115,120 (Utah App. 1999) (citing 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Trial court's 
factual findings that bear on standing, however, are reviewed with deference. 
Nevertheless, "[b]ecause standing involves important policy considerations, appellate 
courts 'will closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits 
the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial court/" Id 
6 
Preservation of the Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal when Pickett, through his attorney, challenged 
Daniel Armstrong's standing to pursue the property damage claim during the Hearing 
conducted on Plaintiffs' damages ("the Damages Hearing")1 (R. 587 Transcript at 41, 48-
49 and 99-100) and in Pickett's two Briefs Regarding Plaintiffs' Damages ("Pickett's 
Damages Briefs") (R. 287-88 and 535). 
Issue #2: 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) provide unsecured individuals who have been 
declared by the trial court in default with partial tort immunity for general damages when 
the claimant does not meet the threshold requirement. 
Standard of Review 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of a statute is 
correction of error. Ong Ml, Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d447, 455 (Utahl993). 
Preservation of the Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal at the Damages Hearing where, after 
extensive argument and the submission of relevant case law, Judge Wilkinson ruled that 
the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) are affirmative defenses 
and do no apply when the defendant cannot assert them because he has been defaulted. 
(R. 578 Transcript at 5-19). 
1
 A transcript of the proceedings of the Damages Hearing is included in the Record 
starting at p. 578 and the references to that transcript will, hereinafter, be referred to as "R. 578 
Transcript" followed by references to specific page numbers. 
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Issue #3: 
Whether Daniel Armstrong's self-serving testimony, unsupported by any medical 
evidence and in fact refuted by the medical evidence, that the accident aggravated a pre-
existing back injury was sufficient to support the trial court's determination of his special 
and general damages. 
Standard of Review 
Factual findings of a trial court can only be set aside when clearly erroneous and 
due regard should given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 5, f 17, 994 P.2d 817, 821. "When a 
reasonable basis exists for the trial court's award of damages, [the appellate court] will 
affirm the damage award on appeal." Id (citing Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); and Breinholt v. Breinholt, 
905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App.1995)). Nevertheless, "[a] finding is clearly erroneous if it 
is 'against the clear weight of evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Cal Wadsworth Const v. 
City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
Preservation of the Appeal 
The issue was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Briefs (R. at 284-87 and 
534-35) and at the Damages Hearing (R. at 391-94) where the lack of any causation 
evidence connecting Dan Armstrong's claimed back pain to the January 7, 1996 accident 
8 
and the total absence of evidence regarding the necessity or reasonableness of an 
executive chair claimed as a medical device and a spa membership were highlighted for 
the Court. 
Issue #4: 
Whether two small, almost imperceptible, scars below Jared Armstrong's jaw-line 
constitute "permanent disfigurement" as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
309(1) and, if so, whether those scars support the general damages awarded by the trial 
court. 
Standard of Review 
Questions about whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given 
rule of law are mixed questions of law and fact. Appellate Courts "review the underlying 
empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard" but the legal effect of those facts 
!is the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's 
resolution of such questions of law."' Drake v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 
181 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). 
If that issue is resolved against Pickett, the sub-issue regarding whether the 
evidence supports the trial court's award of general damages must be reviewed using a 
clearly erroneous standard of review. See discussion of this standard of review for Issue 
#3 Supra and Issue #5 Infra. 
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Preservation of the Appeal 
The issue regarding whether Jared's two minor scars constituted permanent 
disfigurement as that term is used in U.C.A. § 31A-22-109(l) was preserved for appeal 
during the Damages Hearing when the threshold requirements of that statute were argued 
and the trial court ruled that because of Pickett's Default, the Plaintiffs' failure to meet 
those threshold requirements would not prevent them from pursuing claims for general 
damages. R. 578 Transcript at 5-19. The issue regarding the excessiveness of Jared's 
general damages was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Briefs. R. at 288 and 
535-36. 
Issue #5: 
Whether the opinion of Plaintiffs1 expert (based upon a single evaluation 
conducted over three years after the accident) that Taylor Armstrong, suffered a closed 
head injury which might impact him in the future, without more, was sufficient to 
support the trial court's finding that Taylor sustained general damages of $350,000, or 
whether that amount is speculative and based on conjecture in light of testimony from the 
expert that he could not say with any degree of medical certainty what the impact of that 
head injury would or might be. 
Standard of Review 
The appellate court should view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
judgment of the trial court, and the trial court's findings should not be disturbed unless 
there is no substantial evidence to support them. Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 
10 
(Utah 1986) (citations omitted). This issue should be decided utilizing the clearly 
erroneous standard of review. See also Standard of Review for Issue #3 Supra. 
Preservation of the Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Brief. R. at 288-
291and 536-39. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) states: 
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause 
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This case arose from a traffic accident which occurred on January 7, 1996, when 
the vehicle being operated by Pickett traveled through a stop sign and struck a vehicle 
occupied by the Armstrongs. R. 578, 29-30. Following that accident Daniel Armstrong 
(the father), Jared Armstrong (a son), and Taylor Armstrong (a minor son), by and 
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through his mother, all filed suit, alleging that they were "grievously injured and suffer 
from impairments and disability resulting from injuries they incurred when the vehicle in 
which they were traveling was struck by the vehicle driven by defendant Pickett." R. at 
1-2. While liability was contested, the major issues before the trial court dealt with the 
nature and extent of the Armstrongs' injuries and damages. 
During discovery Pickett failed and refused to appear and allow his deposition to 
be taken. Plaintiffs filed a Motion with the trial court seeking to have Pickett's Answer 
stricken and a Default Judgment entered. Plaintiffs' Motion was granted (R. at 138) and 
the Damages Hearing was then conducted on October 16, 2000. SeeR. 578 Transcript. 
At the Hearing, Pickett's counsel argued that before any of the Armstrongs could 
pursue claims for general damages they had to produce admissible evidence that they 
met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (l)(a)-(e).2 R. 578 
Transcript at 5-19. The trial judge, however, ruled that the threshold requirements of 
U.C.A. 31A-22-309(l) provide defendants with an affirmative defense, which would not 
be available to Pickett because his answer had been stricken. R. 578 Transcript at p. 19, 
lines 19-23. 
The following individuals testified at the Damages Hearing: police officer Julia 
Jorgensen [beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 21]; toxicologist, Dennis J. Crouch 
[beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 24]; Daniel Armstrong [beginning R. 578 Transcript 
2The threshold requirements of U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l) are death; dismemberment; 
permanent disability or impairment based on objective findings; permanent disfigurement; or 
medical expenses per person over $3,000. 
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at p. 29]; Lorene Armstrong, [beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 62] and received 
arguments from counsel. Additionally, a binder marked "Plaintiffs Exhibit l"3 was 
admitted without objection as to the form or foundation of the information contained 
therein with objections regarding the admissibility and relevance of the documents and 
information contained therein being reserved. R. 578 Transcript at p. 21. 
At the close of the Hearing, Judge Wilkinson requested written Memoranda 
specifically addressing Plaintiffs'damages. R. 578 Transcript at 108-109. The 
Armstrongs filed their Damages Brief October 31, 2000. R. at 180-263. Pickett's 
Damages Brief was then filed on November 27, 2000. R. at 283-405. Judge Wilkinson, 
however, was dissatisfied with the size and volume of information contained in the 
Briefs that had been submitted and ordered the parties to submit revised Memoranda 
containing a more simplistic itemization of the claimed damages. The parties, therefore, 
prepared and submitted revised briefs. R. at 525-545. 
On January 2, 2001, the trial court issued a Minute Entry, awarding special, 
general, and punitive damages to Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Taylor 
Armstrong. R. at 548. The award to Daniel included $2,884.97 in special damages, 
$10,000 in general damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages. Daniel was also awarded 
3Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 contained records Tabbed A through R [Bate Stamp pp. 1 through 
607, comprising medical records of the plaintiffs, school records of Taylor Armstrong, and 
several depositions, including the deposition of Erin Bigler, Ph. D.; records marked S through V 
[Depositions of Daniel Armstrong, Lx>rene Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Scott Leroy Smith, 
M.D.], and records marked W, X and Y [Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Property Damage Receipts]. 
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property damages ($27,357.49 for the vehicle plus $2,573.89 in "add-ons"). Id. The 
award to Jared included special damages of $2,778.78; general damages of $10,000; and 
punitive damages of $5,000. Id. The award to Taylor included $2,569.63 in special 
damages, $350,000 in general damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages. Id. 
Thereafter, the court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment 
against Pickett consistent with the court's Minute Entry. R. at 550-62. 
The court improperly awarded Daniel Armstrong damages to a vehicle which he 
did not own. In order to pursue a claim for property damage evidence of ownership must 
be presented. There was no evidence presented in this case that Daniel Armstrong had 
any ownership interest or right in the vehicle that was damaged in the accident and the 
trial court's award to him for that property damage should be overturned. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) prohibits plaintiffs from pursuing claims for 
general damages unless they meet one or more of the requirements set forth therein. The 
trial court, however, ruled that this bar to the recovery of general damages did not apply 
in this case because it had entered Pickett's Default. That ruling is contrary to the plain 
language and intent of the statute as well as well established case law that 309(1) 
provides individuals that comply with Utah's financial responsibility laws with partial 
tort immunity from claims for general damages unless the injured individual meets the 
threshold requirements. 
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Even if Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 does not preclude the recovery of general 
damages in this case, the evidence submitted on behalf of Daniel Armstrong, Jared 
Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong was insufficient to merit the trial court's award. 
Daniel did not provide any medical testimony regarding his injuries and failed to 
link his physical complaints to the accident by admissible evidence. The scarring, upon 
which Jared's general damages were based was minimal, unobtrusive and virtually no 
impact whatsoever upon his life. The general damages awarded for that insignificant 
scarring were excessive. Finally, the trial court's award of $350,000 in general damages 
to Taylor Armstrong was speculative and based upon conjecture. Plaintiffs expert 
testified that Taylor had sustained a head injury, but he could not testify to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that it would impact him in the future. He testified generally 
about the difficulties that some people with head injuries can face, but he could not say 
what adversities Taylor would likely face. Without at least some evidence about the 
future impact of an injury upon a plaintiff, an award based upon future problems that are 
possible but not probable is speculative and should not be allowed to stand. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. On January 7, 1996, the Armstrongs and Pickett were involved in a motor 
vehicle accident at the intersection of 3100 South and 4800 West in West Valley City, 
Utah. Plaintiffs Exhibit l4, Bates Stamp p. 1. 
4Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 was not paginated by the District Court Clerk for this Appeal and 
will be referred to hereafter as "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1" with specific references to the Bate Stamp 
page numbers. 
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2. At the time of the accident the Armstrongs were in a 1992 Chevrolet 
Suburban, owned by Lorene Armstrong ("Lorene's vehicle"). Id., Bates Stamp p. 4. 
3. Pickett's vehicle struck Lorene's vehicle just behind the driver's door. Id. 
4. Lorene's vehicle was "totaled" as a result of the collision. See Affidavit of 
Daniel Armstrong, R. at 208 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 277-278. 
5. Daniel, Jared and Taylor filed suit against Pickett seeking to recover 
specific and general damages for injuries they received in that accident. R. at 1-2. 
6. Because Pickett failed and refused to appear to allow his deposition to be 
taken, the trial court struck Pickett's Answer, and entered his default. R. at 138. 
Thereafter a Hearing on Damages was held R. 578 Transcript. 
7. After the Damages Hearing, the trial court entered a judgment awarding 
Daniel special damages of $27,357.49 for the total loss of Lorene's vehicle, even though 
he did not own that vehicle and even though Lorene Armstrong was not a named 
plaintiff in the action.5 R. at 561,11. 
8. Daniel admitted, in his Damages Brief and attached affidavit, that he and 
Lorene had been fully compensated for the value of Lorene's vehicle through payments 
totaling $27,157.49 by Atlanta Casualty (Pickett's insurance company) and by USF&G's 
(the Armstrong's insurer). R. at 182 and 209. 
5While Lorene was a party to this litigation in a representative capacity as the guardian for 
Taylor, a minor child, she did not seek recovery for any of her losses or damages. 
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9. The trial court found that the accident had aggravated Daniel's pre-
existing back injury. R. at 552, f 8. 
10. The following portions of the record contain evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that Daniel's lower back injury had been aggravated:6 
a. R. 578, Transcript, Bate Stamp pp. 30-35, 40, 45-48 (Testimony of 
Daniel Armstrong at the Damages Hearing, Oct 16, 2000). 
b. Plaintiffs Exhibits 3 and 5. (Summary of medical and related expenses 
for Daniel Armstrong and chiropractor's note.) 
c. Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Tab A Bates Stamp p. 4. (West Valley City Police 
Dept. Witness Form). 
d. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D Bates Stamp pp. 83-90 (Pioneer Valley 
Hospital records); 93, 97 (records of Scott Smith, M.D. and Glen Fuller, M.D.); 3 (11-
18-97 Radiology Report); 108-111 (Health Insurance Claim Form, Radiology bills, 
orthopedic chair invoice); Tab P 522 (Medical History). 
e. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab S (Deposition of Daniel Jon Armstrong, 
October 9, 2000, p. 5, lines 6-19; pp.7, beginning line 23- p. 14, line 25; p. 17, lines 3-
10; p. 37, line 15 through p. 39, line 1; p. 44, lines 18-22). 
f. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab T (Deposition of Lorene Armstrong, October 
9, 2000, p. 18, line 18 through p. 20, line 10). 
6Copies of the cited portions of the Record and Exhibits which could support the trial 
court's findings have been submitted in an addendum to Pickett's Brief. 
17 
g. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab V (Deposition of Scott Leroy Smith, M.D., 
October 12, 2000, p. 17, line 8 through p. 18, line 8; p. 25, lines 12 through p. 26, line 
17; and pp. 28-29). 
11. Although the trial court awarded Daniel less than $3,000 in special 
damages, and made no explicit factual finding that he was permanently disabled or 
impaired based on objective findings, as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 to 
recover for general damages, the trial court nevertheless awarded him $10,000.00 in 
general damages. R. at 550-562. 
12. The evidence upon which the award of general damages to Daniel could be 
based is set forth in paragraph 10 and in Plaintiffs' Damages Briefs [R. at 180-182,193-
205 and 525-26] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and settlements 
from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services9'for allegedly comparable 
claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and settlement 
information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before the court at 
the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and unreliable. 
R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's objection and 
Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This inadmissible evidence 
would also support the trial court's award. 
13. Jared sustained TWO puncture lacerations near his left jaw-line. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 119-120; 122, (Pioneer Valley Hospital ER Records, 1-7-96); 
148 (photograph). 
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14. On July 18, 1996, Dr. Jed R. Bindrup performed revision surgery to correct 
FOUR small scars (8 x 5mm; 9 x 4mm; 10 x 4mm; 4 x 9mm) along Jared's jaw line and 
left cheek. Id., pp. 138-140. 
15. Despite Dr. Bindrup's surgical efforts, the scars along Jared's left jaw line 
could not be completely removed, and are still visible under certain lighting conditions 
and when his skin is stretched. R. 148 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U (photograph), 
attached to Telephone Deposition of Jared Armstrong, October 9, 2000. 
16. The trial court awarded Jared less than $3,000 in special damages, and did 
not make any factual finding that he was permanently disfigured, as would be required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 for a general damages award. The trial court did, 
however, award him $10,000 in general damages. R. at 553-554 and 561. 
17. The following portions of the record contain evidence that could support 
the trial court's conclusions: 
a. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab F Bates Stamp pp. 119-120; 122, 129-132 
(Pioneer Valley Hospital ER Records, 1-7-96); p. 148 (photograph); and pp. 135,137-
140, 144-148 (surgical records of Dr. Jed Bindrup and photographs). 
b. Deposition of Jed Reed Bindrup, October 3, 2000 (found in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1, Tab L beginning Bates Stamp p. 371) pp. 5-14 and 22-24. 
c. Deposition of Jared Troy Armstrong, October 9, 2000 (found in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U), pp. 4-9 and 11. 
d. R. 578 Transcript, pp. 35-36; and p. 73. 
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18. The evidence upon which award of general damages to Jared could be 
based is set forth in the preceding paragraph and in Plaintiffs' initial damages brief [R. at 
183-84, 211-17 and 526-527] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and 
settlements from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services9'for allegedly 
comparable claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and 
settlement information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before 
the court at the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and 
unreliable. R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's 
objection and Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This 
inadmissible evidence would also support the trial court's award. 
19. Taylor was also injured in the traffic accident. He experienced a brief loss 
of consciousness at the scene and sustained abrasions to his face. He was diagnosed with 
cuts, bruises and a mild concussion. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 217-220 
20. On June 29, 1999, Taylor was examined by clinical neuropsychologist Erin 
David Bigler, Ph.D., who opined that Taylor had more likely than not sustained a mild 
traumatic brain injury on January 7, 1996. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 459. 
21. When asked about the future impact of the alleged mild brain injury Dr. 
Bigler testified as follows: 
Q: Do you know what Taylor's permanent problems are going to be at this 
point in time? 
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A: I don't know exactly what Taylor's problems will be. As a group, 
children who have these problems can end up with less education, 
end up with less job sophistication. 
Q: Can you say whether Taylor will end up there? Do you have an 
opinion about that? 
A: I can't tell you that. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp p. 453) 
Dr. Bigler was also asked: 
Q: So it's your understanding when you saw [Taylor] in 1999 he was 
worse off, mentally, than he was before the accident? 
A: Well, no. You have to be careful how you say that, because even 
though he was behind, he was still at second-grade level, which is . . 
. He wasn't in the second grade when he had the head injury. 
So, you know, it was not that he was worse, but he was behind 
where he should be, given his age. 
Q: So let me see if I understand this correctly: It's your opinion that the 
accident caused him to move backwards and get behind where he was? 
A: His age-made peer; that's correct. 
Q: And then his progression from that point is he's remained behind his peers, 
but continued to progress? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And that will continue in the future? 
A: We know, regardless of whether this is a brain injury or idiopathic learning 
disability, that certain skills do get better over time. They may stay behind, 
and they may plateau earlier than what is normally the case, but they 
usually do get better until somewhere in mid-puberty; and then you have 
this absolute leveling off, and a plateau that is reached that is 
insurmountable thereafter. 
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Q: And there's no way to tell what that plateau will be for Taylor? 
A: Well, there is. 
Q: Right Now? 
A: Not right at this point. I mean, you really, truly, have to follow these kids 
for several years, to be absolutely definitive of where that's going. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at pp. 455-456. 
22. In spite of the above testimony the trial court found that Taylor's injuries 
"will, in all probability, limit his success in college and obtaining one of the higher 
paying jobs in our economy." and that Taylor "will always be behind in his development 
in relation to his peers." R. at p. 555, f 40; p. 556, f 42. 
23. The trial court also found that Taylor had sustained a total of $2,569.63 in 
special damages and general damages of $350,000. R. at p. 556 ffif 43 and 46. 
24. The following portions of the record contain evidence that could support a 
finding by the trial court that Taylor was permanently impaired as a result of the accident 
of January 7, 1996: 
a. R. Transcript 578 p. 36, beginning line 10 through p.38, line 14; p. 44, 
beginning line 19 through line 25; p. 49, beginning line 23 through p. 52, line 13; p. 53, 
beginning line 14 through p. 60, line 2; p. 63, beginning line 8 through p. 73, line 8; p. 
74 through p. 77, line 9; p. 77, beginning line 15 through p. 89, line 18. 
b. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab H Bates Stamp pp. 213, 217-222 (Pioneer 
Valley Emergency Dept. Records); pp. 250-258 (Reports and records of Erin D. Bigler, 
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Ph. D.); p. 259 (Records of Dr. Scott Smith and Dr. Glen Fuller); Tab M pp. 422- 474 
(Deposition of Erin David Bigler, October 4, 2000); and Tab R pp. 583-607 (school 
records of Taylor Armstrong). 
c. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab S (Deposition of Daniel Jon Armstrong, 
October 9, 2000), p. 17 through p. 23, line 10; p. 35, beginning line 22 through p. 37, 
line 2; p. 38, lines 15-17, p. 39, lines 15-22. 
d. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab T (Deposition of Lorene Armstrong, October 
9, 2000), p. 6, beginning line 4 through p. 16. 
e. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab V (Deposition of Scott Leroy Smith, M.D., 
October 12, 2000), pp. 9, line 17- p. 10, line 13; p. 12, line 3 through p. 15, line 8. 
f. October 23, 2000 Vocational and Rehabilitation Report by MGD 
Management, Inc., R. at p. 219-228. 
g. October 25, 2000 letter of Robert H. Wilde of Paul A. Randle 
Associates. R. 230-253. 
24. The evidence upon which award of general damages to Taylor could be 
based is set forth in the precluding paragraph and in Plaintiffs' initial damages brief [R. 
at 184-189 and 219-2637] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and 
7In addition to information from Rocky Mountain Verdict and Settlements about other 
cases contained in Plaintiffs' initial Damages Brief [R. at, 255-263], it also contained a 
"Vocational and Rehabilitation Report" dated October 23, 2000 (one week after the damages 
hearing) [R. 219-228] and a Draft Copy of an Economic Loss Evaluation dated October 25, 2000 
(9 days after the damages hearing) [R. at 230-253], neither of which were presented discussed at 
the damages hearing. 
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settlements from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services"Tor allegedly 
comparable claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and 
settlement information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before 
the court at the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and 
unreliable. R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's 
objection and Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This 
inadmissible evidence would also support the trial court's award. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Daniel Armstrong Damages for the 
Loss of an Automobile He Did Not Own. 
Because Daniel Armstrong did not have any ownership interest in Lorene's 
vehicle and because full compensation had already been received from insurers, Daniel 
Armstrong should not have been allowed to sue for damage to that property. Rule 17 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest." Courts have held that for one to be a real party in 
interest, and thus to have standing to bring an action for injury to real property, one must 
allege ownership, lawful possession, or right to possess the property in question. 
Friendly Village v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co, 107 Cal Rptr 123 (Cal. App. 1973) (holding 
that condominium association had no standing to sue for property damages suffered by 
condominium owners because they were not title-holders and thus not the real parties in 
interest). See also, Am. Jur. Parties, § 30 ("One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction 
24 
of the court... unless one has an individual or representative capacity some real interest 
in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter 
of the controversy"). 
In this case, the registered owner of the vehicle in question was Lorene 
Armstrong. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 4 (West Valley Police Dept. Traffic 
Accident Witness and Exchange Form). The Complaint does not allege that Daniel 
Armstrong had any ownership interest in Lorene's vehicle, that he had title to the vehicle 
or the right to possess it.. SeeR. 1-3. Without title, proof or even any allegation of 
ownership or the right to possession, Dan Armstrong could not be the real parties in 
interest entitled to sue for damages to the vehicle. He had no standing to sue for such 
damages and it was improper for the trial court to award those damages. 
Moreover, once an insurer has paid for damages, the insurer ordinarily becomes 
the real party in interest by subrogation. See Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403,404 
(Utah 1978). Daniel admitted, in his Damages Brief and attached affidavit, that he had 
been fully compensated for the value of the vehicle through payments totaling 
$27,157.49 from Atlanta Casualty (Pickett's insurance company) and USF&G's, the 
insurers of Lorene's vehicle. R. at 182 and 209. Therefore, the insurance companies are 
the real parties in interest with respect to the property damage to Lorene's vehicle. The 
trial court's award of $27,357.49 (R. at p. 182) to Daniel Armstrong for the automobile 
was thus an error and gave Daniel a double recovery. 
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Finally, the Complaint only alleged that the Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries. 
See R. at 1-3. The damage to the automobile was not raised by Plaintiffs until the 
damages hearing of October 16, 2000, and Defendant's counsel objected to the 
introduction of any evidence regarding the loss of the vehicle. R. 578 at p. 41. The 
introduction of that subject was prejudicial and was not tried by express or implied 
consent. The trial court's award of $27,357.49 to Daniel for damages to Lorene's 
vehicle should therefore be reversed. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding General Damages to Daniel 
Armstrong Because Daniel Armstrong Did Not Meet Any of the 
Threshold Required bv U.C.A. § 31 A-22-309m and He Was Not 
Therefore. Entitled to Recover Any General Damages. 
The trial court also erred in awarding $10,000 in general damages to Daniel 
Armstrong because Daniel did not meet any of the threshold requirements necessary to 
pursue and recover any amount for general damages as provided in Chapter 22 of the 
Utah Insurance Code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 prohibits an individual from 
maintaining a cause of action for general damages in connection with personal injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident unless that individual has met at least one of the 
following threshold damage requirements: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) (1999). 
26 
A. The Aggravation of Daniel Armstrong's Preexisting Back Injury Was Not 
a Permanent Injury Based Upon Objective Findings. 
Daniel did not die, was not dismembered, was not permanently disfigured, and did 
not have medical expenses in excess of $3,000 as a result of the accident with Pickett. 
He could therefore only be entitled to an award of general damages if he was 
permanently disabled or impaired "based upon objective findings" as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(c). There were, however, no objective findings in the 
record that Daniel was permanently disabled or impaired as a result of the January 1996 
accident. 
The trial court merely found that the accident had aggravated Daniel's pre-existing 
back injury. R. at 552, f 8. Furthermore, the court did not find that the aggravation 
constituted a permanent disability or impairment over and above the pre-existing injury 
"based upon objective findings." The court's award of $10,000 in general damages to 
Daniel was therefore contrary to the requirements of Utah law and should be overturned. 
The Utah statute in question requires "objective findings" of permanent 
impairment. This generally means findings by medical specialists. SeeRushton v. Gelco 
Express, 732 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1986) (affirming Industrial Commission's decision to 
adopt findings of medical specialists that worker's compensation claimant did not suffer 
permanent partial disability in spite of claimant's subjective claims regarding her 
injuries); McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah App. 1997) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant in auto accident case where plaintiffs subjective allegations of 
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permanent impairment in complaint and deposition failed to meet objective standard 
because no medical evidence was presented). In this case, however, the finding of 
aggravation was supported solely by Daniel's self serving and subjective testimony. 
There was no medical testimony whatsoever that Daniel had sustained any injury to his 
low back from the accident. 
The evidence in the record regarding the aggravation of Daniel's injury fails to 
meet a minimum evidentiary standard, let alone, an objective standard required by the 
statute. A few of Daniel's medical records submitted in this case demonstrated that 
Daniel may have experienced back pain, but do not connect it to the January 7, 1996 
accident. The only evidence on the nature and extent of the aggravation of Daniel's back 
injury was his own subjective testimony at the damages hearing of October 16, 2000 and 
in his deposition of October 9, 2000. In both instances, Daniel presented a subjective 
account of the problems he experienced with his back before and after January 7, 1996. 
For example, he related that "[he] had previously had an injury to the lower back and it 
would wake [him] up about 3:30-4:00. [After the accident] it was waking [him] up at 
2:00." R. at 578, p. 30 (Damages Hearing). He also related that prior to the January, 
1996 accident, he exercised two or three times a week to relieve his back pain, but that 
after the accident, he would "have to do [exercises] every day, many times." Id. at 33. 
However, NO expert medical testimony or opinion at all was presented at the 
Damages Hearing to support the notion that the January 1996 accident had resulted in 
any back pain and nothing can be found elsewhere in the record that would support a 
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finding that Daniel was permanently impaired or disabled by the accident. Moreover, the 
medical records in evidence are inconsistent with Daniel's testimony because they fail to 
show that he experienced any back problems following the accident. 
Daniel's Emergency Room records from the day of the accident do not contain 
any treatment for or complaints of low back pain following the accident. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1; Tab D at Bate Stamp pp. 83-88. Furthermore, the day after the accident 
Daniel saw his family physician, Dr. Scott Smith, and was treated for: 
(a) tenderness over lower rib cage and over right flank; 
(b) blood in his urine; 
(c) tenderness over the left neck muscles; and 
(d) pain in his strap, trapezius and rhomboid muscles. 
He did not, however, receive any treatment for, or voice any complaints about, low back 
pain. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at Bate Stamp p. 93 (January 8, 1996, entry). A little 
less than three weeks later, Daniel returned to Dr. Scott Smith, complaining of mild 
headaches, shoulder and neck aches but never mentioned low back pain. [Id. (entry for 
January 27, 1996)]. From January 27, 1996, through May 11, 2000, Daniel saw Dr. Scott 
Smith on ten occasions for many concerns and problems, but there is absolutely no 
mention whatsoever that he ever sought treatment for, or voiced complaints of, low back 
pain resulting from the accident. [Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at Bate Stamp pp. 92-97. 
It is undisputed that Daniel had previously suffered a severe low back injury five 
or six years before this accident. The existence of that injury is evidenced in Plaintiffs 
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Exhibit 1, Tab D Bate Stamp p. 97 of Dr. Smith's records, where it indicates Daniel's 
back pain from an old injury was exacerbated by a horseback ride, and he was diagnosed 
with possible disc disease. 
Evidence of the severity of Daniel's pre-existing low back injury is also contained 
in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab P (Daniel Armstrong's medical records from Cottonwood 
Hospital and Medical Center). The evidence there shows that, on admission for an 
appendectomy in 1993, Daniel personally advised the medical professionals that he had 
been involved in a car accident in 1990 "with a L5/S1 disc crushed." Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1, Tab P, Bates Stamp p. 522. Additionally, his Patient History Questionnaire which he 
personally filled out on that visit relates that he was already experiencing problems 
sleeping caused by back pain after lying for just three to four hours. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, 
Tab P Bates Stamp p. 545. 
The first and only recorded indication that Daniel experienced any different back 
pain after the accident at issue in this case occurred in November of 1997, where it was 
self reported, when he went to LDS Hospital for an MRI Scan of his lumbar spine over 
twenty-two months after this accident. At that time he described "back pain down the 
right leg, moderate for one year." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at p. 103. Even pursuant 
to his own account given at that time, he was free from any new pain for at least ten 
months following the accident. 
Although the record supports a finding that Daniel had a pre-existing back injury, 
it contains no evidence, other than his unsupported testimony at the damages hearing and 
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at his deposition, which connects his back pain, following January 7, 1996, to the 
accident at the heart of this dispute. Because neither Daniel's subjective testimony, nor 
the medical evidence in the record, constitutes evidence of permanent impairment or 
disability based upon objective findings, Daniel should not recover any amount for 
general damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
B. The Statutory Threshold Limitations of the PIP Statute Provided Pickett 
with Tort Immunity for Dan Armstrong's Claims for General Damages. 
The trial judge erred in holding that the threshold limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309 were an affirmative defense "stricken through [Pickett's] default." R. 578 
Transcript at 19. This statute unequivocally states that a person who is required to have 
personal injury protection coverage for automobile accidents "may not maintain a cause 
of action for general damages" unless his injuries are sufficiently serious or his medical 
bills are over $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)-(e) (emphasis added). 
By its clear terms, the statue absolutely prohibits an action for general damages when its 
requirements are not met. 
This court has held that when interpreting a statute, "primary goal is to give effect 
to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans 
v. State, 963 P.2d 1777, 184 (Utah 1998). The plain language of the statute is the best 
evidence of the legislature's intent. State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1995). 
Because § 31A-22-309(l)(a)-(e) clearly, unequivocally, and absolutely prohibits a 
plaintiff from bringing a cause of action for general damages unless he can make the 
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required showing of serious injury or medical expenses over $3,000, its command is 
more than merely an affirmative defense. 
The trial court's holding vitiated the statute and circumvented its purpose by 
prohibiting Pickett's counsel from raising it at the damages hearing. In enacting § 
31A-22-309 the legislature intended to 
. . . effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling 
the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of automobile 
accidents, these being those not involving great amounts of damages. 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, ch. 55, § 2, 1973 Utah Laws 141. 
Allowing the Armstrongs to pursue claims for general damages without first 
requiring them to prove that they had met the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309, 
would set a precedent that encourages precisely the evil that the legislature meant to cure: 
mounting litigation costs that drive up the price of insurance. If, merely, by virtue of a 
defendant's default, a party can maintain a cause of action for general damages, in 
contravention of the statute, then plaintiffs' attorneys will be encouraged to bring cases 
to court that would not make any economic sense in the absence of the possibility that a 
defendant will default. 
At first glance it might appear that, apart from the unjust and potentially 
financially devastating impact on individual defendants, default judgments for general 
damages from minor motor vehicle accidents would not have a tremendous societal 
impact. Careful consideration of all the potential issues, however, raises serious 
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concerns regarding the potential obligations of the insurer providing underinsured and 
uninsured motorist protection benefits to plaintiffs. Must they step in and defend the 
unrepresented parties to avoid a default judgment? Would they be bound by such a 
judgment? If so, when? If not, under what circumstances? If the trial court's decision in 
this case is allowed to stand, insurance companies will waste legal resources defending 
against lawsuits where actual damages are minimal, but lawsuits seek huge general 
damages based merely on the possibility that defendants will default. In order to protect 
consumers from rising insurance costs that would result from this practice, this court 
should hold that the statute is an absolute bar to claims for general damages when at least 
one of the threshold requirements is not met and it is not an affirmative defense that must 
be asserted in a defendant's pleading. 
In a rather comprehensive discussion of PIP benefits this court has held "under 
[Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309], first party PIP benefits up to the amounts provided in 
Section 6 are paid to an injured person without regard to fault. Furthermore, the injured 
party is precluded from maintaining an action to recover general damages (all damages 
other than those awarded for economic losses), [footnote omitted] except where the 
threshold requirements of Section 9(1) are met." Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 
(UT 1980) (emphasis added). This court went on to hold that "if a party has the security 
required under Section 5, the no-fault insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is 
granted partial tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable for the benefits provided 
under Section 6. He does, however, remain liable for customary tort claims, viz., general 
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damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6, 
where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met." Id. See also Bear River Mut 
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460. 
In the instant case Pickett complied with the financial security requirements of 
Utah's Motor Vehicle code and he, therefore, should enjoy the privileges of "partial tort 
immunity" for general damages where the Plaintiffs do not meet the threshold 
requirements of U.C.A. 31A-22-309(l) and freedom from liability for Section 6 benefits. 
C. Even if the PIP Threshold Limitations Do Not Apply, the Evidence Does 
Not Support the General Damage Award to Dan Armstrong. 
The trial court erred in awarding $10,000.00 in general damages to Daniel 
because he did not present any objective medical evidence that made a causal connection 
between his post- January 7,1996 back pain and the accident that is the subject of this 
appeal. In all but the most simplistic personal injury scenarios, the testimony of lay 
witnesses is insufficient to demonstrate the nature, cause, and extent of an injury or the 
need for specific medical treatment. Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 Utah App. 285 \ 16, 
12 P.3d 1015. Further, the "'diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are 
medical questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay 
persons.'" Id., (citing Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E. 2d 
832,834(1987). 
In Beard, Darlene Beard sued K-Mart after being accidentally struck in the head 
by a K-Mart employee. She claimed that neck and wrist surgeries were necessary after 
34 
the accident. At the close of her case, K-Mart unsuccessfully moved for a partial directed 
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show a causal connection between 
the K-Mart accident and the surgeries. In reversing the trial court's denial of the directed 
verdict for K-Mart, the Utah Court of Appeals found that "[n]o expert medical testimony 
was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident." Id. at 
f 20. In his testimony, Beard's surgeon was not willing to say that the K-Mart accident 
was, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the cause of the neck (bone spurs) 
and wrist (carpal tunnel syndrome) problems that required surgery. Id. at tf 18-20. 
Instead, he conceded that Beard's neck and wrist problems pre-existed the accident, and 
that heredity, wear and tear, gravity, and other stresses of Beard's life could have caused 
such problems. Id. 
Similarly, in the case on appeal, Daniel was suffering from preexisting back 
problems at the time of the January 7, 1996 accident. No medical testimony or other 
medical evidence was presented that established, to a reasonable medical probability, 
that the accident was the source of the back pain Daniel claimed to experience after the 
accident. Under the holding of Beard, Daniel's subjective testimony that his pain was 
different after the accident than before was, by itself, insufficient to establish that the 
accident was the cause of his pain. Evidence of a causal relationship between the 
January 7, 1996 accident and Daniel's subsequent back pain was needed from an expert 
witness. Because Daniel had preexisting back pain, the question of this relationship 
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raised complicated medical issues that could not be resolved by the trial court without the 
help of expert medical evidence. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, Daniel's medical records flatly contradict his 
subjective allegations. The medical records he submitted at the damages hearing 
[Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tabs E and P] do not show that he experienced any new and 
qualitatively different back pain after the January 7,1996 accident until November of 
1997, almost two years later, when he went to LDS Hospital for an MRI Scan of his 
lumbar spine. The trial court's award of $10,000 in general damages to Daniel, 
therefore, had no basis in reasonable medical probability, and should be reversed. 
HI. Jared's Scars Were Not Permanently Disfiguring and He, Therefore, is 
Not Entitled to Any General Damages. 
The trial court also erred in awarding $10,000 in general damages to Jared 
because he failed to show that he met any of the threshold requirements for general 
damages as provided in Chapter 22 of the Utah Insurance Code. As stated above, Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) prohibits an individual from maintaining a cause of action 
for general damages in connection with personal injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident unless that individual has met at least one of the following threshold damage 
requirements: (a) death; (b) dismemberment; (c) permanent disability or permanent 
impairment based upon objective findings; (d) permanent disfigurement; or (e) medical 
expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) (1999). 
Jared, however, did not meet any of those threshold requirements. 
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The Evidence Does Not Support the General Damages Awarded to Jared 
Armstrong. 
Jared did not die, was not dismembered, was not permanently impaired or disabled 
in the January 7, 1996 traffic accident. He did, however, sustain some permanent 
scarring that could not be corrected by surgery. Thus, he would be entitled to general 
damages only upon a showing that those scars constituted a ''permanent disfigurement" 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l). 
The issue this court must address generally is whether any scarring at all, however 
minor or inconspicuous constitutes "permanent disfigurement" and specifically, whether 
Jared's scars permanently disfigured him. Because Jared did not testily at the Damages 
Hearing and the only evidence of the scarring is in the photographs found at Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1 at Bate Stamp pp.148 and Exhibit to Jared's Deposition at Tab U, this court 
can easily determine whether his scarring constitutes "permanent disfigurement." 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, Utah courts "look first to 
the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted). "[Courts] presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). 
Dictionary definitions are often used to interpret statutory tenns. See, e.g. Zoll& 
Branch, P.C. v. Asay 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997); CountyBd. of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com% 927 P.2d 176, 179 (Utah 1996). The 
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following three dictionary definitions of "disfigure', then, may help to clarify what the 
legislature meant by "disfigurement" in § 31A-22-309(l)(d): 
To mar or spoil the appearance or shape of; deform. 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Fourth Edition (2000). 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/72/D0267200.html. 
To impair (as in beauty) by deep and persistent injuries. 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) p. 362. 
To spoil completely the appearance of (esp. a person's face) 
Cambridge Dictionary of American English Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/. 
From these definitions it is clear that the term "disfigure" is associated with 
deformity, deep injury, and complete spoilage. However, a statute "should be construed 
as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and 
with the overall legislative objective of the statute," the general context should be 
controlling. Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). See also 
State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating "a fundamental rule 
of statutory interpretation requires that a statute 'be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished* " (citation omitted). 
Viewed in light of this principle, the context in which the phrase "permanent 
disfigurement" occurs in the statute clears up any ambiguity regarding the legislature's 
intent. Parts (a), (b) and (c) of § 31A-22-309(l) enumerate "death", "dismemberment", 
"permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings" before 
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going on to list "(d) permanent disfigurement" as the fourth threshold requirement. The 
general context of § 31A-22-309(l), then, evinces a general theme of serious and 
devastating injuries rather than mere blemishes. 
The record demonstrates that the two scars Jared received from January 7, 1996 
are not seriously disfiguring, nor have they had a devastating impact on him. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 119-120 and 122 (Pioneer Valley Hospital 
records). Five months after the accident Jared had surgery to revise four small scars: 
three on his left jaw line and one on the left side of his neck, the dimensions of which 
were 8 x 5mm; 9 x 4mm; lOx 4mm; and 4 x 9mm. It is unclear from the evidence in this 
case what portion of those surgical costs were to revise the scars received in this accident 
and what portion was to revise his other scars. Three photographs appear in the record 
and provide all the evidence used by the trial court to determine Jared's damages: two at 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 148 and one attached as an exhibit to the Telephone 
Deposition of Jared Troy Armstrong, October 9, 2000. The first two appear to be taken 
from an angle below the jaw line, and the third appears to represent a close up, with the 
skin stretched up over the jaw line to emphasize the scar's appearance. The scars along 
the jaw line that can definitely be attributed to the accident do not appear to be in an area 
that is readily visible from the photographs, and they are sufficiently small that they 
would not ordinarily attract attention. 
When asked, at his deposition, how the scars affected him, Jared replied, "I just 
look in the mirror and I see them, and I wish they weren't there." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, 
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Tab U at p. 8 lines 6-7. This was the only direct testimony by Jared concerning the effect 
the scars have had upon him. The only other evidence that could support the trial court's 
award of damages was hearsay testimony from Jared's mother that sometimes girls he 
dated would notice the scars and sometimes they would not R. at 578, p. 73, lines 16-22, 
and the plastic surgeon's record that, upon admission for surgery, Jared felt that the scars 
looked like "big zits." R. at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 140 (Records of Jed R. 
Bindrup, M.D., June 10, 1995). 
In light of the insignificance of the scars, their location, the minimal evidence 
presented to substantiate that they permanently disfigured Jared or even had a deleterious 
impact on his life, the trial court's award of $10,000 in general damages should be 
overturned. The scars do not meet the requirement of "permanent disfigurement" as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l). Alternatively, even if the threshold does 
not bar recovery, the minimal evidence regarding the affect of the scarring upon Jared's 
life cannot support such a large award of general damages. 
IV. The Trial Court's Award of $350.000 in General Damages to Tavlor 
Armstrong Was Based on Speculation and Conjecture. 
The trial court erred in finding that Taylor's brain injury would "in all probability, 
limit his success in college and obtaining one of the higher paying jobs in our economy," 
that "he will always be behind in his development in relation to his peers." R. at 555, f 
40 and 556, f 42. While Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Erin Bigler, made general statements 
about possible effects of brain injuries on children generally, Taylor's own school 
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records and scholastic achievement tests show no evidence that he is currently suffering 
from any such effects and do not support an award of $350,000 for his general damages 
or future losses. 
The evidence regarding the magnitude and impact of Taylor's alleged brain injury 
consists of the testimony of his parents; Taylor's emergency room records; a report, 
deposition testimony and testing of an expert witness in neuropsychiatry who evaluated 
Taylor three years and six months after the accident; and Taylor's school and scholastic 
aptitude test results. While the testimony of Taylor's parents and Dr. Bigler tend to show 
that Taylor sustained a mild traumatic brain injury8 in the January 7, 1996 accident, 
Taylor's subsequent performance in school and on standardized tests do not support the 
trial court's finding that Taylor's brain injury will "in all probability, limit his success in 
college and obtaining one of the higher paying jobs in our economy," or that "he will 
always be behind in his development in relation to his peers." 
While Dr. Bigler made generalized and blanket statements regarding the effects of 
closed-head injuries upon children when he testified that, 
[w]e have three areas where there are typical problems with children who 
have had a head injury. One is increased neuropsychiatric. What that 
means is, there are higher frequencies of depression-anxiety type disorders 
and stress disorders that occur in individuals who have had a head injury. 
According to Dr. Bigler, loss of consciousness and "post-traumatic amnesia" are 
definitive indicia of a brain injury. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 427. They are not, 
however, definitive indicators of a permanent injury or future problems. SeeT>r. Bigler's 
testimony regarding Taylor's future. 
41 
The second is that there is increased risk for learning disabilities and 
learning problems in kids who have had a head injury. 
And the last is-not necessarily meeting the level or standard of 
neuropsychiatry disorder where there is actual treatment for anxiety, 
depression, stress-but kids with head injury tend to be more impulsive, 
problems with judgment, problem with ability to sustain attention and 
concentration. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp pp. 439, lines 11-25, 440 line 1. Dr. Bigler 
could not say, however, testify with any degree of certainty, or even probability, what the 
future impact of the injury upon Taylor would be. Dr. Bigler testified as follows: 
Q: Do you know what Taylor's permanent problems are going to be at 
this point in time? 
A: I don't know exactly what Taylor's problems will be. As a group, 
children who have these problems can end up with less education, 
end up with less job sophistication. 
Q: Can you say whether Taylor will end up there? Do you have an 
opinion about that? 
A: I can't tell you that. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp p. 453. 
Dr. Bigler was also asked: 
Q: So it's your understanding when you saw [Taylor] in 1999 he was 
worse off, mentally, than he was before the accident? 
A: Well, no. You have to be careful how you say that, because even 
though he was behind, he was still at second-grade level, which is .. 
. He wasn't in the second grade when he had the head injury. 
So, you know, it was not that he was worse, but he was behind 
where he should be, given his age. 
42 
Q: So let me see if I understand this correctly: It's your opinion that the 
accident caused him to move backwards and get behind where he was? 
A: His age-made peer; that's correct. 
Q: And then his progression from that point is he's remained behind his peers, 
but continued to progress? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And that will continue in the future? 
A: We know, regardless of whether this is a brain injury or idiopathic learning 
disability, that certain skills do get better over time. They may stay behind, 
and they may plateau earlier than what is normally the case, but they 
usually do get better until somewhere in mid-puberty; and then you have 
this absolute leveling off, and a plateau that is reached that is 
insurmountable thereafter. 
Q: And there's no way to tell what that plateau will be for Taylor? 
A: Well, there is. 
Q: Right Now? 
A: Not right at this point. I mean, you really, truly, have to follow these kids 
for several years, to be absolutely definitive of where that's going. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at pp. 455-456. 
Because Dr. Bigler could not testify about the magnitude or impact of Taylor's 
claimed injury, it was pure speculation by the trial court that caused it to award him 
general damages of $350,000. In the case of Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 
598, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a case where the Plaintiff had not 
met his burden of proof regarding causation. It held "[w]hen the proximate cause of an 
injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." Id. at 601 (citing Mitchell 
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v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) and Staheli v. Farmers'Co-op. ofS. 
Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982)). In the instant case there is a total absence of 
evidence about Taylor's future condition. Any award for his future condition, therefore, 
would not be supported by admissible evidence and would be based upon pure 
speculation. Plaintiff had the burden of proof regarding Taylor's injury and failed to 
meet it. 
Furthermore, Taylor's scholastic records belie Dr. Bigler's speculative statements 
that Taylor would even fall into the same categories as children with traumatic brain 
injuries. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Tab R, Bate Stamp pp. 582-606. The records do 
indicate that shortly after the accident Taylor was behind in reading during the first 
grade. Thereafter, however, they show that Taylor made good progress in school, and 
that he was average or above average in every aspect of his elementary school education 
at the time of the trial court's judgment. See Taylor's overall scholastic record, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab R at Bate Stamp p. 584; his second, third, and fourth grade 
report cards at Bate Stamp pp. 594, 595, and 596; his Student Assessment Profile for 
reading and verbal skills at Bate Stamp pp. 598 (July 1997); 602 (July 10, 1998); p. 604 
(June 30, 1999); and his SAT results of an October 1999 test at Bate Stamp p. 606. 
Because Plaintiffs failed to produce any admissible evidence regarding the nature 
or magnitude of Taylor's brain injury on him, or that it caused him to be "permanently 
disabled" the trial court's award of general damages should be overturned. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Judgments against Pickett and in favor of 
Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong should be duly modified to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-309(l) and the evidence which was before the 
trial court when it made its decision. 
DATED this i x day of November, 2001. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
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Atttorneys for Defendant/Appellant Glen C. 
Pickett 
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ADDENDA 
The Addenda required by Rule 24(11), Utah R. App. P. would make this Brief 
unreasonably thick and the Addenda to this Brief, therefore, have been bound as a 
separate document which is being submitted herewith. 
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